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“Angsthasen!” 
Harald “Toni” Schumacher in a conversation with us about penalty kickers, who shoot to the middle of the goal. 
 
 
I. Introduction: Penalty taking and game theory 
  In soccer, penalty kicks and shootouts are taken from twelve yards (= 10, 9728 meters) 
out from goal, with only the goalkeeper between the penalty taker and the goal. Penalty kicks 
were first introduced in Ireland in the 1891-92 season in order to punish a foul within the 
penalty area. Penalty shootouts were introduced in 1970 to determine who progresses after a 
tied match. Since then, penalty taking determined the outcome of numerous soccer games and 
tournaments, including, for instance, the FIFA World Cup finals 1994 between Brazil and 
Italy, and 2006 between Italy and France. In this paper, we ask what strategies in penalty-
taking can be considered ‘clever’ or ‘rational.’ We focus in particular on strategies that 
involve shooting to the middle of the goal.   
  Game theory analyzes and predicts behavior when people interact with each other. 
Taking the framework of the interaction – the game – as given, game theory offers solutions. 
A game includes the rules of interaction, the strategies available to the “players,” and the 
payoffs (or ‘utilities’) each player assigns to all possible outcomes of the game. A solution 
(equilibrium) is a prediction or recommendation which strategy to choose, assuming that all 
players wish to maximize their given payoffs. A game form is the description of an interactive 
decision situation without the specification of particular payoffs for the players involved. The 
idea of the game form is to describe, analyse and evaluate (e.g. in terms of efficiency) 
equilibrium behavior for any kind of preferences players of this game may reasonably have. A 
game form can be identified with an institution within which players have to act. From this 
perspective, game theory focusses on behavior arising from a given set of institutional rules 
and asks how institutions affect behavior. The answer, as we will argue, may depend on the 
shared perceptions of the interactive decision situation by the players. 
  Regarding penalty taking, the institutional rules are pretty clear, even though they may 
change over time.
1 The strategies available to the players are, however, less obvious, and in 
                                                 
1 According to the official FIFA laws  (Fédération Internationale de Football Association), “A penalty kick is 
awarded against a team that commits one of the ten offences for which a direct free kick is awarded, inside its 
own penalty area and while the ball is in play. A goal may be scored directly from a penalty kick. Additional 
time is allowed for a penalty kick to be taken at the end of each half or at the end of periods of extra time.  […] 
The ball is placed on the penalty mark. The player taking the penalty kick is properly identified. The defending 
goalkeeper remains on his goal line, facing the kicker, between the goalposts until the ball has been kicked.”; see 
http://www.fifa.com/en/laws/Laws14_01.htm for this and more rules about penalty kicks. Penalty shootouts are 
generally governed by similar rules.    3
fact we will discuss the impact of different possible sets of strategies – and hence different 
game forms – on behavior in this paper. We will also argue that the payoffs assigned to the 
outcomes of penalty taking, goal or no goal, are more subtle than has previously been 
assumed. Players may not only want to maximize respectively minimize the probability of a 
goal, but there are also indications that players have preferences over the strategies that can be 
chosen.  
 
II. A (too) simple game theoretic model 
  Let us begin with the simplest possible game theoretic modelling of what might be 
called the “penalty-duel.” A penalty-duel involves two players, the kicker and the goalkeeper.
2 
The interests of the players are perfectly opposing; success of the kicker implies failure of the 
goalkeeper, and the other way round. More precisely, the conflict structure is such that the 
goalkeeper wants to coordinate his action with the one of the kicker, while the kicker aims at 
discoordination of actions. We also assume that the two players must move simultaneously, 
implying that players are not able to react to the movements of the opponent. Indeed, many 
observers argue that neither does the speed of the ball allow goalkeepers to react to the ball’s 
course (e.g., Palacios-Huerta 2003) nor does a goalkeeper wish to move early in order to 
avoid signalling to the kicker about his intentions. Furthermore, Chiappori et al. (2002), 
among others, provide empirical evidence suggesting that moves of the players in penalty 
taking are simultaneous ones.
3  Summing up, from a simple game theoretic perspective, a 
penalty-duel can be seen as a simultaneous, two-person game with strictly opposing 
preferences.  
  What are the strategies available to the players? A simple model assumes that the 
kicker (K) has only two options; he can either choose to kick to the left side (L) or to the right 
side (R); the option of shooting to the middle is ignored here for the moment (as it is the case 
in large parts of the literature). Accordingly, the goalkeeper (G) can either jump to the left or 
to the right side. (Here and in the following, left and right is defined from the kicker’s 
perspective.) The following table then shows the ‘payoffs’ from the four potential pairs of 
actions. 
 
                                                 
2 Here and in the following, we abstract away from the possibilities of rebounds.  
3 We will briefly come back to the simultaneity assumption in the conclusions.   4
  K  y 1-y 
G    L R 
x  L  1,0 0,1 
1-x  R  0,1 1,0 
 
Game I: A simple penalty game. 
 
  If both players choose the same side (the top left or the bottom right corner of the 
table), the goalkeeper succeeded in coordination and manages to save the penalty. In this case, 
the kicker’s payoff is zero and the goalkeeper’s payoff is normalized to one. In the cases, 
when the goalkeeper fails to jump to the side chosen by the kicker, who succeeded in 
discoordinating actions, there is a goal and the goalkeeper’s payoff is zero while the kicker’s 
payoff is normalized to one.
4 Because interests are perfectly opposed, payoffs always sum up 
to the same amount, regardless of the strategies being chosen. Normalizing this amount to one 
gives the payoffs a probability interpretation; kickers aim to maximize the probability of 
scoring, while goalkeepers aim to minimize this probability.  
  What is a rational strategy in the penalty-duel, as described in Game I? A good 
strategy should be a best response to the opponent’s strategy. When all players choose a best 
response to the other players’ strategies, this set of strategies constitutes what is called a 
(Nash) equilibrium in game theory. In equilibrium, nobody has a unilateral incentive to 
deviate from his own strategy. Off equilibrium, however, there is at least one player who can 
improve upon his outcome (given the utilities assigned to each outcome) by switching the 
strategy. So, any advice to the players that does not constitute an equilibrium would be bad 
advice for at least one player, because if all other players follow their parts of the advice, it 
would be better for some player to do differently than he was advised. From another 
perspective, any prediction that is not equilibrium would be problematic, because such 
prediction would be based on the assumption that at least one player does not play in line with 
his interests. Finally, an equilibrium can often be interpreted as a potential stable point of a 
dynamic adjustment process in which players search for better strategies. Summing up, 
                                                 
4 For simplicity, we abstract away from the possibility that the kicker misses the goal.   5
equilibrium strategies are not only rational strategies but also natural candidates for 
predictions of behavior.  
  Games like the penalty-duel, in which payoffs always sum up to the same constant, are 
called constant-sum games and are well-understood from the very beginning of game theory. 
A constant-sum game is equivalent to a zero-sum game, because the value of the constant is 
arbitrary; it measures utility, which can be freely normalized.  Von Neumann (1928) and von 
Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) developed a solution theory for such games based on the 
notion of a maxminimizer. A unique feature of this class of games is, that any (pure stratgy) 
Nash equilibrium consists of strategies, which are maxminimizers for the players. These 
strategies require players to react to the “worst case” possible; i.e. always to believe that the 
opponent takes the least preferred (or most harmful) action. Indeed, in games with strictly 
opposing interests, this is a reasonable belief. Not all games considered in this paper are 
constant-sum, but all are strictly competitive. Strictly competitive games have the property 
that an advantageous change in behavior for one player is automatically disadvantegous to the 
other one. Such games are the ordinal equivalent of zero-sum games.  
  It can easily be seen that the penalty-duel has no equilibrium in so-called pure 
strategies. If the goalkeeper chooses L, the kicker’s best response is R. But if the kicker 
chooses R, the goalkeeper’s best response is R etc. No pair of pure strategies, one for the 
kicker and one for the goalkeeper, constitutes an equilibrium. However, the game theoretic 
notion of a strategy is quite general, and in particular it includes “mixed” strategies that are 
probability distributions over actions such as R and L. When mixing, players choose their 
actions randomly. In our simple penalty game, there is a unique equilibrium in mixed 
strategies, which gives an equal chance of winning to each player. The probabilities of 
choosing L respectively R for the kicker and the goalkeeper, respectively, in Game I are: 
 
(x, 1-x) = (0.5, 0.5) 
(y, 1-y) = (0.5, 0.5). 
 
Clearly, when following these strategies, each player chooses a best response against the 
opponent’s strategy. The resulting equilibrium payoffs for the goalkeeper and the kicker, 
respectively, are calculated as the expected payoffs given the equilibrium strategies and can 
be interpreted as probability of success. For Game I, these payoffs are given by: 
 
∏G  =  ∏K  =  0.5   6
 
for the goalkeeper and the kicker, respectively. 
  So, in penalty-duel, each player must randomize. Randomization makes sure that there 
is no recognizable pattern in the behavior of a player that could be exploited by the opponent 
to his detriment (and his own advantage). How does this state come about? The Fundamental 
Lemma (see e.g. Osborne 2004, Chapter 4) characterizes mixed strategy equilibria of finite 
games as follows: 
 
A mixed strategy profile is a (mixed strategy) Nash equilibrium, if and only if, for 
each player, the expected payoff to every action to which a player`s strategy 
assigns positive probability is the same (and at least the expected payoff to any 
action which is assigned zero probability). 
 
  So, any player’s expected payoff in equilibrium is her expected payoff to any of his 
actions that he uses with positive probability. A player is thus indifferent between these 
actions; more precisely, he is made indifferent by the opponent´s behavior, to which all these 
pure strategies are best replies. And this aim in turn determines the choice of probabilities by 
the opponent. 
  Randomization does not imply, however, that a player actually flips a coin, he may 
still choose a pure strategy (which need not be arrived at as the realization of a coin flip). But 
his mixed strategy represents a consistent way to reason about the opponent`s behavior (who 
may have several best replies against this strategy).
5 
  We finally note that, mainly because of the random element, penalty taking has been 
criticized as an unsatisfactory way to decide a soccer game. Therefore, various alternatives 
have been proposed, including golden and silver goal methods, replaying a match that has 
ended in a tie, winner determination according to the number of shots on goal, number of 
corner kicks or other measures (see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Penalty_shootout_(football)). 
However, before 1970, drawn games between national teams were decided by another random 
move: the toss of a coin. Random decisions are in fact quite often used in modern societies, 
not only in sports to break ties, but also in social life to resolve conflicts in the allocation of 
public housing and scarce medical resources, the awarding of oil drilling leases, admission to 
                                                 
5 For empirical studies of mixed equilibrium play in soccer see Chiappori et al. (2002), Palacios-Huerta (2003), 
Moschine (2004), and Sonnabend (2006), and for a corresponding study in tennis see Walker and Wooders 
(2001). A survey of empirical and experimental studies on mixed-equilibrium play related to penalty taking in 
soccer is provided by Sonnabend (2006).    7
educational institutions, professional athletic drafts, tax auditing, as well as military drafts and 
jury selection (Elster 1989). Recent experimental evidence demonstrates that fair random 
lotteries are often acceptable to all participants, even those, who lose the lotteries (Bolton et al. 
2005, Bolton and Ockenfels 2006). In this sense, the random element in equilibrium play 
appears to be less problematic than it seems at first glance. However, later in this paper, we 
will develop a more realistic model, in which the players’ skills affect the probability of 
success, so that the outcome is still influenced but not entirely determined by randomness. 
 
III. Stability and Institutional Design 
  The institutional context is critical to game-theoretic analysis. Optimal strategies 
depend on the rules of the game, on the assumed payoff structure, and on behavioral standards 
as reflected by the strategies available to the players. Game theoretic equilibrium identifies 
mutually stable strategies within a given institution, but pure equilibrium analysis typically 
does not address the stability of the institutions themselves.
6 For instance, the rules for penalty 
kicks have been changed repeatedly since 1891, indicating that earlier proposals were not 
stable. Initially, the goalkeeper was permitted to move up to six yards away from his goal-line 
to defend a penalty, while later he was not allowed to leave the goal line. Then, he was not 
allowed to move on the goal line before the kick was executed, until 1997 when moving 
before the kick became allowed.
7  
  In this section, we want to emphasize a more subtle evolution of institutional design 
through behavioral innovation, which affects the set of strategies available to the players 
within the rules of soccer as specified by the governing bodies. In particular, we emphasize 
that the simple game studied above, which essentially views the penalty duel between 
goalkeeper and kicker as the choice of a corner of the goal, is not stable against the 
introduction of a new strategy or behavior of the kicker, namely, opting for the the middle of 
the goal. If the goalkeeper insists on opting for corners exclusively, this would guarantee 
success for the kicker choosing middle, M. Consequently, the goalkeeper is forced to consider 
strategy M as well. The analysis of the resulting 3x3-game confirms that the kicker gains 
from the introduction of M in equilibrium: 
 
                                                 
6 Güth and Ockenfels (2003 and forthcoming) study the mutual stability of institutions and behavioral patterns in 
evolutionary models, where institutions and behavior are allowed to affect each other through co-evolution. 
7 See http://www.fifa.com/en/news/index/0,1464,22688,00.html?articleid=22688 for some historical fact about 
the evolution of the penalty law.   8
  K  y1 y 2 y 3 
G    L M R 
X1  L  1,0 0,1 0,1 
X2  M  0,1 1,0 0,1 
X3  R  0,1 0,1 1,0 
 
 
Game II: A penalty game, which includes the middle strategy. 
 






































Note that the kicker, who succeeds in 6 of the 9 possible instances in discoordinating actions, 
now has a probability of success, which is twice the one of the goalkeeper, who (as before) 
only succeeds on the diagonal in coordinating actions. The reason is that equilibrium 
strategies make the realization of all 9 instances equally likely. This reduces the expected 
payoff of the goalkeeper from 1/2 in the previous game to 1/3 and increases the payoff of the 












We credit Johan Neeskens, a Dutch midfielder playing for Ajax Amsterdam and FC 
Barcelona in the 1970s, with this clever innovation, which gradually changed the perception 
of the essence of the penalty game by kicker and goalkeeper from a 2x2 to a 3x3 game. E.g., 
the German site of Wikipedia mentions that ever since the 1974 World Cup Final, Neeskens is   9
credited by soccer commentaries as the inventor of the Neeskens-variant  (“Neeskens-
Variante”) of taking a penalty: shooting straight to the middle, while the goalkeeper dives for 
a corner (http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Johan_Neeskens). In this game the referee awarded a 
penalty to the Netherlands against Germany in the second minute of the game, which 
Neeskens had the nerve to take in precisely this way – while Sepp Maier, the German goal-
keeper, opted for his right corner. During his long and distinguished career Neeskens was 
runner-up at the World Cups 1974 (in Germany) and 1978 (in Argentina), when in each case 
his Dutch side lost the final to the host country. He won the European Club Championship 
1971-1973 with Ajax Amsterdam and the European Cup Winners Cup in 1979 with FC 
Barcelona (against Fortuna Düsseldorf (!) in a most dramatic match, which ended 4:3 after 
extra time). In 1981 he appeared in his last of 49 matches for the Netherlands. 
  As mentioned by wikipedia the double prominence of the occasion, a penalty in the 
second minute of World Cup Final, propelled the Neeskens-variant  to international 
prominence and recognition as a valid and serious option of taking a penalty. It is not known 
to us, whether there ever was a penalty at a similarly important or internationally prominent 
occasion, which was (intentionally?) taken this way before. However, there was another – and 
now in Germany equally historical – penalty taken this way at an almost equally important 
and prominent occasion two years later: the last penalty of the penalty shoot-out that decided 
the Final of the European Championships in 1976 between Germany and Tchechoslovakia. It 
was taken by Antonin Panenka, who delicately chipped the ball right into the middle of the 
goal mouth – while Sepp Maier opted for his left corner. Panenka undoubtedly did so 
intentionally. He later said: “I knew long before that I would take the penalty this way.” His 
own goalkeeper warned him the night before the final, that – if the occasion should arise – 
doing so would be “too arrogant.” Panenka himself was aware of this and the risk that 
belonged to it: “If Maier would have stayed put, they would have sent me to the factories for 
the next 25 years. The communists would have accused me of ridiculing their system” 
(Martens, 2003). Alas, it went well to the fame of Panenka (and the Neeskens-variant). 
  These observations lead us to the following claim: before 1974 (and the Neeskens-
penalty) the “institution” penalty-duel was a standard of behavior, according to which kickers 
chose L  or R and  goalkeepers did likewise. That is, a 2x2-game form gives an accurate 
description of the penalty situation.  After 1976 (and the Panenka-penalty) the “institution” 
penalty-duel was perceived as a 3x3 game form constrained by certain behavioral rules. 
  In order to check for the empirical validity of our claim, we tried to get adequate data 
from penalty kicks and shootouts before Neeskens’and after Panenka’s goal. However,   10
although we spoke to Bundesliga and national goalkeepers, journalists, TV stations, 
professional sports data providers, many scientists, and others, we could not trace detailed 
data that include information about the players’ strategies and sufficient data from penalties 
before 1974.
8 What we have, however, are the following summary statistics of Bundesliga 
penalties from 1963-1990 (Ressource: Bundesliga Datenbank, Ismaning).  
 
Year  Total   Goals    Scoring rate over time     
 penalties    in  penalties 
1990   83  62 
1989 70  53 
1988 72  50 
1987 83  67 
1986 110  86 
1985 111  92 
1984 100  71 
1983 113  86 
1982 86  66 
1981 116  92 
1980 94  77 
1979 94  59 
1978 88  70 
1977 102  83 
1976 79  59 
1975 106  74 
1974 126  91 
1973 98  76 
1972 114  83 
1971 102  71 
1970 72  58 
1969 71  46 
1968 72  49 
1967 90  66 
1966 81  53 
1965 93  66 
1964 72  48 
1963 63  41 
Sum   2561  1895 
Figure 1: Bundesliga penalties 1963-1990 
 
  Figure 1 shows that there are between 63 (1963) and 126 (1974) penalties per season 
in the German Bundesliga. The overall success rate of penalty kicks is 74%, ranging from 
62% (1963) to 82% (1985). The average success rate from 1963 to 1973 is 69%, and the 
average success rate 1977 – 1987 is 77%. Applying an exact Mann Whitney U test, this 
difference is significant at the 1% level (two-sided). The same test yields a two-sided p = 
0.013 if we compare the 1963-1974 with 1975-1990.  
                                                 
8 Toni Schumacher lent us his famous note book, in which he documented penalty taking strategies for his own 
use. See Appendix I for a sample page. However, the data turned out not to be helpful for our purposes, because 
there are not enough data for statistical analysis, especially before Neeskens’ penalty kick in 1974. Sepp Maier 
told us that he is a “practitioner” and not a “theorist” and that therefore he was never interested in statistics, and 
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  The graph in Figure 1 suggests, however, that the difference is at least partly due a 
general trend (the straight line shows the result of a simple linear regression); in fact, statistics 
cannot reveal a structural break in the mid seventies, which would be an indicator that 
Neeskens’ innovation caused a significant advantage for the kicker. However, it might also be 
that Neeskens’ innovation diffused only slowly over time, so that our data would be too rough 
to detect supportive evidence for our claim. An ultimate test must be left to further research 
based on more detailed data about shot and jump directions before and after 1974.  
 
IV. Opting for alternative M: Why is the middle relatively unattractive to players? 
  While there is anecdotic evidence, there is no statistically unambiguous evidence in 
our data that Neeskens’ innovation significantly changed the way penalty kicks were executed. 
Part of the reason might be that the middle is a less attractive strategy than the corners to both, 
kickers and goalkeepers: Based on data from 459 penalties from French and Italian League 
1997 – 2000, Chiappori et al. (2002) found that  
 
•  the kicker chooses middle less often than either corner, 
•  the goalkeeper chooses middle less often than either corner, and  
•  the goalkeeper chooses middle less often than kicker (in fact, goalkeepers almost 
never stay in the middle).
9 
 
As a consequence, kicking to the middle on average has the highest probability of scoring 
(81.0% as compared to 70.1% for the right corner and 76.7% for the left corner; see Table 4 in 
Chiappori et al. 2002). Obviously, these observations are not in line with our simple model of 
Game II, which suggests that the middle should be as attractive as each of the corners. They 
also appear inconsistent with the Fundamental Lemma described above: in equilibrium, the 
expected payoff to every action to which a player’s strategy assigns positive probability 
should be the same. 
  Chiappori et al. (2002) explain some of these effects with heterogeneity with respect to 
the players’ capabilities to score when choosing one of the three strategies, left, right and 
middle. For instance, it is typically easier for a kicker to score when kicking to the converse 
side of his strong foot. This heterogeneity can explain why certain strategies are more often 
chosen than others by certain kickers. (In fact, goalkeepers seem to take into account kickers’ 
                                                 
9 Other studies, including the work by Palacios-Huerta (2003), do not take shots to the middle as a possible 
strategy into account of the analyses.   12
past behavior, which supports the view that heterogeneity drives some of the results.) But it 
cannot explain the superior average scoring rate for the middle strategy. So we suspect that 
heterogeneity is only part of the explanation.  
  In order to find out more about why the middle seems a rather unattractive strategy 
despite the strategic advantage of using it, we asked Harald “Toni” Schumacher and Hans-
Jörg Butt about their strategies in penalties.
10  Toni Schumacher is considered one of the 
world’s best goalkeepers during the 1980s. He was capped 76 times for Germany, and he was 
a winner of the European Championship 1980 and World Cup finalist in 1982 and 1986 with 
the German team. He won national titles in the Bundesliga with 1. FC Köln and  Borussia 
Dortmund. Hans-Jörg Butt is an active goalkeeper playing in the Bundesliga for Bayer 
Leverkusen, and he was elected three times to the German national team. In 2002 he was 
runner-up with his team Bayer Leverkusen in the European Champions League, the German 
Bundesliga and the German Cup competition. He is most remarkable – and unique – among 
German goal keepers, because he is not only considered a ‘penalty killer` -  Wikipedia notes 
that he on average saves 7 out of 10 penalties -, but at the same time one of the most 
successful penalty takers. He currently (November 2006) has 26 goals from the penalty spot 
to his credit, more than any other goalkeeper ever in the Bundesliga. So, if anyone knows how 
to put himself into the opponent`s shoes, it is him. 
  Both goalkeepers confirm that there is heterogeneity among kickers, though the 
classifications they use are quite different. Toni Schumacher mentioned that there are 4 types 
of kickers distinguishable according to whether they shoot with the left or right foot, and 
whether the shot is powerful or more technically demanding. A powerful shot from a right-
footer, for instance, would most likely go to the left corner. Hans-Jörg Butt, on the other hand, 
classifies kickers according to whether they try to react to goalkeepers, or whether they 
choose the corner independent of the movements of the goalkeeper. So, there is heterogeneity 
– implying that we should not observe equal probabilities for choosing the actions right, 
middle and left. At the same time, however, both goalkeepers suggested that the 
unattractiveness of the middle-strategy is also driven by an asymmetric payoff structure, 
which has not been considered in earlier work. Toni Schumacher, for instance, noted that he 
never just stayed in the middle. Asked why, he responded that this would be “against my 
honour.” When we remarked that, knowing this, a kicker’s best response would be to shoot in 
the middle, he answered that a kicker, who shoots in the middle, “does not deserve to kick a 
penalty against me,” and that this would be “a different game” (sic!). While Hans-Jörg Butt 
                                                 
10 Our meeting with Harald Anton Schumacher, commonly known as Toni Schumacher, took place on 21 August 
2006 in Cologne, and the meeting with Hans-Jörg Butt on 31 August 2006 in Leverkusen.    13
also pointed out that there are technical difficulties with shooting to the middle (“schippen”), 
he reasoned that it is a larger “disaster” for the kicker when a shot to the middle is saved 
(recall Panenka`s statement!), than it is a disaster for the goalkeeper when he does not save a 
shot to the middle. A kicker, who gets caught in the middle is a “fool” (in German: “Depp”). 
Gary Lineker of England can attest to this, because he was unfortunate enough to try to copy 
Panenka in a match England versus Brasil in 1991: his fine, slow chip to the middle of the 
goal mouth found the literally unmoved Brasilian goalkeeper waiting for it on the line. It truly 
looked ridiculous (and became part of soccer folklore, see e.g. Martens, 2003). 
 Both views indicate that the payoffs associated with corner respectively middle actions need 
to be treated asymmetrically. The following variation of Game II incorporates Butt`s 
argument, the new game has an asymmetric payoff payoff structure: 
 
  K  y1 y 2 y 3 
G    L M R 
X1  L  1,0 0,1 0,1 
X2  M  0,1 1+b,-b 0,1 
X3  R  0,1 0,1 1,0 
 
Game III: A penalty game with modified payoffs. 
 
Note that game III, too, is a constant-sum game; i.e., players again will play there maxmin-
strategies in equilibrium. The following table gives equilibrium strategies for different values 
of the parameter b > 0: 
   14
 





    
 
Table 1: Equilibrium strategies for Game III. 
 
The general formulae for the unique mixed strategy equilibrium of the game and the 
equilibrium payoffs are given by 
 
x* = (x1, x2, x3) =  ((1+b)/(3+2b), 1/(3+2b), (1+b)/(3+2b)) 
y* =  (y1, y2, y3) = ((1+b)/(3+2b), 1/(3+2b),(1+b)/(3+2b)), 
 
and the equilibrium payoffs are : 
 
∏G = (1+b)/(3+2b) 
∏K = (2+b)/(3+2b). 
 
The equilibrium is symmetric, M is used less and less often with increasing b in favour of L 
and R, and the kicker gets a higher payoff than the goalkeeper for all b. The extreme values 
for b yield our Games I and II:  b = 0 obviously results in Game II, while – interestingly –  b 
going to infinity yields equilibrium play of Game I (which is a 2x2-game) in this 3x3-game. 
The unique mixed strategy equilibrium in this limiting case is no more completely mixed. It 
only mixes over the corner strategies L and R, which are the only strategies in Game I. Butt’s 
argument therefore accounts for the different treatment of corner and middle options by the 
two players. However, it cannot account for the different treatment of the middle option by 
the two players, which we will address later. 
  Alternatively, consider yet another variation, Game IV. Suppose that there is some 















































































































the same corner. This uncertainty is represented by t in [0,1], where t represents the capability 
of the kicker; i.e. t = 1 implies that the kicker always scores when kicking to one of the 
corners, even when the goalkeeper jumps to the same side. Kicking to the middle will not 
score when the goalkeeper chooses to remain in the middle, however. Accordingly, t = 0 
implies that the kicker never scores when the goalkeeper jumps to the same side, because, say, 
the kicker cannot shoot sufficiently powerful and accurate (as was implicitly assumed in the 
Games I-III). In this sense, t represents the quality of the kicker. 
 
  K  y1 y 2 y 3 
G    L M R 
X1  L  1-t,t 0,1 0,1 
X2  M  0,1 1,0 0,1 
X3  R  0,1 0,1 1-t,t 
 
Game IV: An equivalent penalty game with modified payoffs. 
 
Dependent on t equilibrium strategies and payoffs are given by 
 
x* = (x1, x 2, x 3) = (1/(3-t), (1-t)/(3-t), 1/(3-t)) 
y* = (y1, y2, y3) = (1/(3-t), (1-t)/(3-t), 1/(3-t)) 
 
∏G  = (1-t)/(3-t) 
∏K = 2/(3-t) 
 
By inspection of the formulae, and perhaps somewhat surprisingly, this story yields the same 
prediction for equilibrium behavior as Game III before: Game II now corresponds to the 
extreme value t = 0, and equilibrium play of Game I follows for t = 1. But note that the 
equilibrium payoffs in the latter case are now 0 (for the goalkeeper) and 1 (for the kicker). 
Perfect kickers (t = 1) never miss, if they aim for a corner (irrespective of the goalkeepers 
action). So Game IV, too, may account for the relative unattractiveness of the strategy M. An   16
outside observer could not say, whether observed behavior (frequency of actions by each 
player) results from equilibrium play of Game III with parameter b o r  G a m e  I V  w i t h  
parameter  t = b/(1 + b) as both games determine equilibrium identically (!) under this 
condition.  
  Which description of the game, Game III or Game IV, and which corresponding 
interpretation is the right one? People may differ in their opinions. However, as it turns out, 
both games and both interpretations are, in fact, equivalent: the payoffs in Game IV can be 
obtained by an affine transformation of the payoffs in Game III. Because payoffs in our 
games can be arbitrarily normalized, affine payoff transformations do not change predicted 
strategies or outcomes. More specifically, affine equivalent games have the same (mixed) 
strategy equilibria (see e.g. Leininger et al. 1988, or Ritzberger 2002, chapter 5). In  Appendix 
II we give an explicit transformation of Game III into Game IV by purely affine operations.  
  Once realized, this should not be too surprising to the reader. The more reliable a 
kicker can score by shooting to one of the corners, the greater the relative disaster from being 
unsuccessful when shooting to the middle, and the larger the payoff to the goalkeeper to have 
succeeded against a high-quality kicker. In the end, both payoff presentations tell the same 
story from two different angles. In equilibrium then the same behavior is required to level 
relative  advantages of pure strategies in a mixed strategy equilibrium according to the 
Fundamental Lemma (see above). 
 
  K  y 1-y 
G    L R 
X  L  1-t,t 0,1 
1-x  R  0,1 1-t,t 
 
Game V: Another penalty game with modified payoffs. 
  
  Game IV, too, may be regarded as an institutionally changed version of a 2x2 game: 
comparing the 3x3 Game IV with the 2x2 Game V yields a slightly different, but related story 
for the unattractiveness of the middle strategy. Game V is identical to Game IV with the 
exception that the middle strategy is not present. That is, by comparing the equilibrium   17
outcomes of Game V with the outcomes of Game IV, we can again measure the effect of 
having the middle strategy available. 
  In equilibrium of Game V, the probability of choosing L or R is  
 
x* = y* =  ½ 
 
for both players (and all t ε  [0,1]). The scoring probabilities (equilibrium payoffs) for 
goalkeeper and kicker, respectively, are: 
 
∏G  = (1-t)/2  
∏K =  (1 + t)/2 
 
Observe that the kicker’s payoff ranges from 1/2 for t = 0 to 1 for t = 1.  
  Compare now payoffs in equilibrium of  Games IV and V: since 2/(3-t) - (1+t)/2  = (1-
t)
2/(6-2t) > 0 
 for all t ε [0,1), it follows that the introduction of M to the stratgy sets of the 
penalty game works in favour of the kicker.Yet, a high quality kicker (t large) only stands to 
profit marginally from the availability of the middle strategy and hence uses it rarely when 
indeed it is available. For instance, comparing scoring probabilities to the kicker in both 
games, we obtain: 
 
•  For t = 0  the scoring probability increases from 1/2 to 2/3. 
•  For t = ½  the scoring probability increases from 0.80 to 0.87. 
•  For t = 0,80  the scoring probability increases from 0.90 to below 0.91. 
•  For t = 1  the scoring probability in both cases is 1. 
 
Assume now that kickers have private information about their quality t. Then, each shot 
reveals information about the payoffs involved, and thus about the kicker’s quality. In 
particular, a shot to the middle decreases the estimation of a kicker’s t. (This might mirror 
Toni Schumacher’s statement that considering shots to the middle would involve a “different 
game.”)
11 For this reason, kickers may hesitate to choose the middle. 
 
                                                 
11 One testable hypothesis from this might be that amateur soccer players, with smaller t-values, shoot more 
often to the middle than professionals.    18
V. Explaining the players’ different uses of  M 
  So far, all equilibria of all games have been symmetric in the sense that kickers and 
goalkeepers opt for M with the same probability. However, Chiappori et al. (2002) remarked 
that goalkeepers very rarely chose M compared to kickers. In their data, only 11 out of 459 
goalkeepers remained in the middle, while 79 out of 459 kickers chose to kick to the middle 
(see their Table 3). This observation appears to be in line with the statements of both, Toni 
Schumacher and Hans-Jörg Butt, who confirmed that staying in the middle is a very unlikely 
strategy for goalkeepers. Schumacher’s further elaboration, that a shot to the middle, whether 
successful or not, discredits a kicker with dishonourable or “un(sports)manly” behavior, takes 
the argument one step further: the following model captures this additional effect without 
increasing the number of parameters compared to our Games III and IV. It reflects the idea 
that not only missing in the middle is bad for the kicker, but also scoring to the middle yields 
smaller payoffs to the kicker than scoring by shooting to one of the corners. This yields the 
following non-constant-sum game, which nevertheless is strictly competitive: 
 
  K  y1 y 2 y 3 
G    L M R 
X1  L  1,0 0,b 0,1 
X2  M  0,1 1+b,-b 0,1 
X3  R  0,1 0,b 1,0 
 
Game VI: A non-constant-sum penalty game. 
 
The following table gives equilibrium strategies for various values of the parameter b: 
   19
  b = 1  b = 0.8  b = 0.6  b = 0.5 
x* 
 






Table 2: Equilibrium strategies for Game VI. 
 




























































For the relevant parameter range 0.5 < b < 1, both players use M less often than L or R, and 
the goalkeeper less often than the kicker. At the extreme value b = 1 (scoring to the middle is 
as good as scoring to a corner) both players use middle with the same probability. A decrease 
in b; i.e. making scoring to the middle less attractive than scoring to a corner, leads to less 
frequent use of M by the goalkeeper and more frequent use by the kicker. These – at first 
sight somewhat counterintuitive consequences – are once more easily understood by the 
content of the Fundamental Lemma about the strategic interaction in mixed strategy 
equilibrium: the decreased attractiveness of M to the kicker has to be offset by the goalkeeper 
with a corresponding decrease in attractiveness of L and R for the kicker in order to restore 
indifference for the kicker between all options. The goalkeeper does so by choosing L and R 
more often at the expense of choosing M. This more than offsets the lost attractiveness of M 
to the kicker, who now opts for M more often. At the other extreme (b = ½) this argument 
drives the goalkeeper to always choosing L or R (and hence never going for M). Because of 
the relative unattractiveness of scoring to the middle, the kicker uses M nevertheless only 























































  Still, for all b ε (0.5, 1) it is true, that the kicker’s payoff in equilibrium exceeds the 
goalkeeper’s payoff: 
 
∏G =  (4b
2+5b+1)/[(4b+1)(3+2b)] 
∏K =  (4b
2+8b+1)/[(4b+1)(3+2b)] 
 
More importantly, the scoring probability is larger than ½, and varies between 15/24 = 0.625 
for b = ½  and 16/25 = 0.64 for b =1. 
  This simple one-parameter model captures the essential features of the data, in 
particular with respect to the strategy M, and confirms Neeskens’ intuition that establishing 
the middle alternative as a valid option for the kicker results in an advantage for the kicker. It 
increases the probability of scoring in equilibrium, when both players behave optimally 




  Our paper demonstrates, along with previous work in sports economics, that game 
theory is a powerful tool to analyze and describe strategic behavior in the penalty-duel. At the 
same time, we emphasize that game theoretic advice and predictions depend critically on the 
exact characterization of not only the underlying game pattern but also the perceptions of this 
by the players. In more sociological terms, a penalty-duel interlocks the roles of kicker and 
goalkeeper in an interactive decision situation. Thus, from an analytical perspective, the 
relevant penalty-duel institutions do not only include the objective rules of the game 
determined by the FIFA but also the players’ expectations about how the different roles are 
supposed to perform. Identifying such institutions can be difficult. Players may change their 
behavior and hence the way institutions are perceived over time, they may even differ in their 
perceptions of the game being played at a given time; and the perceptions may differ between 
insiders, who are actually playing the game, and outsiders, who are trying to understand 
behavior. 
  In game theory, a player’s task is to find an equilibrium strategy taking the game as 
given. However, understanding the (equilibrium) interaction is only part of the art of playing 
games. Neeskens and Panenka demonstrated that going beyond shared perceptions of how to 
play the game (i.e. fulfil the roles of the institution), and devising new, innovative strategies 
may yield a competitive edge. They possibly changed the way penalty-kicks are perceived in   21
a permanent way.
12  Their innovation seems to account for and answer to the growing 
competitiveness of professional sports – and in particular soccer – due to increased 
commercialization. While game theory may capture the consequences of institutional change 
created by innovators such as Neeskens and Panenka (as we demonstrate in this paper), it 
cannot easily promote creativity in institutional design, because it must start with a 
description of all available strategies.
13 
  Another conclusion from our study is that even if players perceive institutions 
differently, they might in fact play the same game, with perfectly equivalent incentive 
structures. So, different perceptions do not necessarily exclude standard game theoretic 
analyses. However, game theoretic analysis must take the perceptions of the players serious. 
We demonstrate how a number of empirical observations and statements by goalkeepers (and 
a kicker) about the attractiveness of the middle in penalty taking can be accounted for by an 
equilibrium analysis of the penalty duel with modified payoffs. Kickers and goalkeepers do 
not only have preferences on the outcome of the game, goal or not goal, but also on the way 
the goal is shot or saved, which has to do with the perception of their roles.  Although new 
behavior in a role may become legitimate, it need not be perceived as acceptable as the 
traditional one. More specifically, our study strongly suggests that a shot or even goal to the 
middle is evaluated differently than a shot or goal to a corner by both, goalkeepers and kickers. 
This has not been observed before.  
 
 
                                                 
12 Of course, breaking out of conventions and (re)shaping the way institutions are perceived can also be a clever 
strategy with long-lasting effects in economic and social environments. 
13 However, there is a growing literature on economic design challenges; see, e.g., Roth (2002), Kittsteiner and 
Ockenfels (2006) and Ockenfels et al. (2006) for selective reviews. Also, there appears to be more room for 
institutional design in penalty taking. Toni Schumacher and Hans-Jörg Butt mentioned many other strategies that 
add to the institutional complexity and that are neither considered in our game models in this paper, nor by any 
other game theoretic approaches to penalty taking that we are aware of. Toni Schumacher, for instance, 
mentioned that a couple of ‘signals’ from the kicker helped him to save penalties, such as the line of sight after 
the kicker has put the ball on the penalty spot, or the position of the foot of the supporting leg. Both goalkeepers 
also noted that they tried to make the kicker insecure. Toni Schumacher (Hans Jörg Butt) mentioned, for instance, 
that he would lean towards the corner which he did (not) choose, or that he sometimes offered the kicker a bet. 
Moreover, Hans Jörg Butt gave an intriguing account of his strategies as a penalty taker and goalkeeper, which 
suggests that a penalty duel could be modelled as a waiting game. It is exactly these kinds of subtleties that seem 
to make the duel interesting.   22
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Appendix I : Excerpt from Toni Schumacher´s notes 
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Appendix II: Transformation of Game III into Game IV 
 
      














    
        














L 1,0 0,1 0,1       set    L 1,0  0,1  0,1 
M 0,1  1+b,-b 0,1    b =     M  0,1       ,  0,1 
R 0,1 0,1 1,0       R 0,1  0,1  1,0 
            Game III                   
 
Multiplying player G’s payoffs with the constant c1=(1-t) yields: 
 
        





















       














L 1-t,0 0,1  0,1  
to all of player K´s  L 1-t,0  0,1 0,1 
M  0,1     1,  0,1    payoffs given M of  M     0,       1,0     0, 
R 0,1 0,1 1-t,0    player G  R 0,1  0,1  1-t,0 
 
                  Game III (1)                 Game III (2) 
 
 
Next, multiply player K´s payoffs with the constant c3 = (1-t): 
       















and finally add c4= t
        














L 1-t,0  0,1-t 0,1-t   
to the payoffs of  L 1-t,t  0,1 0,1 
M  0,1     1,0  0,1    player K given L of  M 0,1 1,0 0,1 
R 0,1-t  0,1-t 1-t,0    G and given R of G  R 0,1  0,1  1-t,t 
 
                  Game III (3)                            Game IV 
 
 
Game III has the same equilibria as Game III (1). 
Game III (1) has the same equilibria as Game III (2). 
Game III (2) has the same equilibria as Game III (3). 
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